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FailureVietnam·Super-App / Ride-Hailing·2018–2024·5 min read

Gojek Vietnam: What Worked in Jakarta Did Not Work in Ho Chi Minh City

Gojek launched in Vietnam in 2018 as GoViet, backed by $500M in regional expansion capital and the momentum of its Indonesian dominance. After six years and nearly ₫5,700 billion in accumulated losses, it exited in September 2024. The lesson was not about Vietnam's market size — it was about what made Gojek's model work in Indonesia and why those conditions did not exist in Vietnam.

In 2018, Gojek launched in Vietnam under the brand GoViet — a standalone entity with its own management team, app, and identity, positioned as the opening move in a $500M regional expansion strategy.[1] Gojek had just established dominance in Indonesia and was expanding aggressively to prevent Grab from consolidating Southeast Asia.

On September 16, 2024 — six years later — Gojek terminated GoRide, GoFood, and GoSend services across Vietnam, accumulating an estimated ₫5,700 billion (approximately $230M) in losses over its operating life in the country.[2] It represented less than 1% of Gojek's platform gross revenue despite years of subsidy-driven expansion.[3]

What Went Wrong

1. Grab Had Already Won

When Uber exited Vietnam in 2018, Grab absorbed the majority of its customer base and held roughly 73% of the Vietnamese ride-hailing market when GoViet launched.[1] This was not a market with an open competitive landscape waiting to be captured — it was a market where the primary competitor had first-mover advantages, established driver and merchant networks, and deep brand recognition. Displacing Grab required not just matching its offering but providing a reason for customers to switch, at scale, against a competitor that could match any promotional spend.

2. The Indonesia Playbook Did Not Transfer

Gojek's Indonesian dominance was built on a unique set of conditions: a fragmented informal transport market, a population with limited access to formal financial services that benefited from GoPay's digital payments ecosystem, and a competitive window before Grab had established its current position. None of those conditions existed in Vietnam in 2018. Vietnam had different consumer behaviour, different regulatory requirements around taxation and employment, and a different competitive landscape — including strong local players like Be and, later, Vingroup's electric taxi service Xanh SM.[3]

3. Leadership Instability and Strategic Drift

GoViet cycled through two experienced CEOs in its second year of operation as it attempted to balance growth targets with profitability pressures. The standalone brand and management structure — intended to enable local adaptation — instead created coordination problems with the Gojek parent company and unclear accountability for strategic decisions.[1]

4. Profitability Was Structurally Elusive

Vietnam's ride-hailing market is characterised by high price sensitivity, thin margins, and a competitive dynamic that punished any reduction in subsidies with immediate churn. Gojek's Vietnam losses peaked at nearly ₫1,400 billion in 2022 before the company stopped "burning money" in 2023 — at which point its revenue also declined sharply, confirming that the customer base had been subsidy-dependent rather than loyalty-driven.[2]

Key Lessons

  • Dominance in your home market does not create a transferable playbook. Gojek's Indonesian success was built on specific structural conditions that needed to be verified — not assumed — before entering Vietnam.
  • Entering a market where the leading competitor has 73% share requires a differentiated strategy, not a matching one. Promotional competition against an entrenched incumbent with deep pockets is a path to losses, not market share.
  • The regulatory environment in each market is distinct. Vietnam's rules on taxation, employment classification, and competition differ meaningfully from Indonesia — differences that affect cost structure, operational model, and competitive positioning.
  • Customer acquisition through subsidies is not the same as customer retention through value. When subsidies end, loyalty built on price evaporates.

Sources

  1. Tech Wire Asia, "Gojek refocuses its regional ambitions in Vietnam," August 2020. Documents Grab's 73% market share at GoViet's launch and the leadership changes in year two.
  2. VietData, "Fierce ride-hailing market in Vietnam: Grab starts making billions in profit, Gojek loses nearly 6,000 billion before giving up." Documents the ₫5,700 billion in accumulated losses and the 2022 peak loss of ₫1,400 billion.
  3. Vietcetera, "Gojek Leaves The Vietnam Market As Growth Companies Push For Profitability," 2024. Reports the less-than-1% platform gross revenue figure and analysis of local competitor strength.

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